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BENJAMIN, JOYCE AND THE 
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DEAD 
GRAHAM MACPHEE 
The idea of eternity has always had its strongest support in death.  If this idea declines 
[… then] the face of death must have changed.  It turns out that this change is identical 
with another – the one that has diminished the communicability of experience to the 
same extent as the art of storytelling has declined. 
--Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller” (1936) 
I
In Ulysses death is everywhere, immured in the present as memory, mourning, 
ritual, tradition, allusion, etymology, or simply the iterability that is the 
necessary condition of meaning. Indeed, consciousness seems to exist only as 
the fraught and ultimately futile attempt to hold back the impatient and 
ineluctable return of the dead—the “nightmare” of history from which Stephen 
is trying to awake. And when the guard of consciousness is down, as in 
Nighttown, the text stages a Judgment Day where “the dead of Dublin from 
Prospect and Mount Jerome in white sheepskin overcoats and black goatfell 
cloaks arise and appear to many”(U 526)
However, if death pervades the text, it does not function to mark, as 
in T.S. Eliot, an immutable chthonic to set against the vagaries of historical 
time. It is important not to underestimate Joyce’s figuring of death, for if the 
appearance of the dead invokes traditional modes of belief, the conditions of 
appearance are fundamentally modern. This modernity is perhaps nowhere so 
striking as in the Hades episode, where Bloom’s profane imagination 
undercuts both the Catholic Latin of the Requiem mass and the Protestant 
English preferred by Tom Kernan. For Bloom, the promise of eternal life 
collapses in a heap of bones and scattered organs, at whose center sits the 
desacralized heart: 
A pump after all, pumping thousands of gallons of blood everyday. 
One fine day it gets bunged up and there you are. Lots of them lying 
around here: lungs, hearts, livers. Old rusty pumps: damn the thing 
else. The resurrection and the life. Once you are dead you are dead. 
The last day idea. Knocking them all out of their graves. Come forth, 
Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then 
every fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest 
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of his traps. Find damn all of himself that morning. (U 107) 
For all its comical ghoulishness, Bloom’s outlook is not without pathos 
– as evidenced by his concern for Paddy Dignam’s bereaved son (“Poor boy! 
Was he there when the father?”) (U 104). Indeed, both empathy and 
irreverence can be understood as functions of that wider historical condition 
we have come to associate with the secularization of death, a condition which 
underlies Bloom’s practical turn of mind. The same practical outlook that 
renders the heart a “rusty pump” pumping thousands of gallons a day 
ultimately finds its corollary in the technical description of the Ithaca episode: 
Did it flow? 
Yes. From the Roundwood reservoir in county Wicklow of a cubic 
capacity of 2,400 million gallons, percolating through a subterranean 
aqueduct of filter mains of single and double pipeage constructed at 
an initial plant cost of £5 per linear yard by way of the Dargle, 
Rathdown, Glen of the Downs and Callowhill to the 26 acre reservoir 
at Stillorgan, a distance of 22 statute miles. (U 591) 
Here we find those myriad tendencies that have come to define modernity: as 
the disenchantment of the world; as the subsumption of nature under the rule 
of equivalence in commodity production; as the age of the world picture and 
the advent of technology. 
The practical turn of mind fixes the visible and, by extension, the 
invisible within uniform spatio-temporal co-ordinates. Thus Bloom imagines 
an underground world “all honeycombed” with “oblong cells”, muses on the 
fertility of “the soil […] quite fat with corpse manure”, and speculates that 
there would be “more room if they buried them standing up” (U 110). To the 
practical mind, the invisible is subject to the same laws that govern the visible, 
and in a sense we might identify a similar extrapolation from the sensory 
world to the supersensible in modernity. It is not that the supersensible directly 
mirrors the sensory world, but rather that the supersensible must recognize or 
negotiate with profane temporality. Or to put it another way, in modernity our 
conceptions of value and meaning must come to terms with the temporality of 
technology.
 In contemporary criticism, attempts to reorient our thinking of time 
have been powerfully influenced by deconstruction, a critical perspective that 
has found a particular affinity with modernism’s linguistic playfulness. In 
“Ulysses Gramophone” (1984), Jacques Derrida famously invokes the 
stuttering “Kraahraark! Hellohellohello” of the gramophone that Bloom 
imagines as a complement to memorial photography, exploiting its 
etymological double charge in order to reframe the temporality of the living 
voice in terms of the technicity of writing.1 The gramophone stands as a figure 
for the essay’s “preontological” (Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone” 302) 
conception of the double yes, which as a “universal presupposition” (Ibid., 
1 Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone. Hear Say Yes in Joyce”, in Derek Attridge, 
Acts of Literature (London: Routledge, 1992), 253-309. 
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303) locates within “the manipulatory operation of hypermnesic 
reappropriation” (Ibid., 304) the inevitability of “all the risks of technical 
repetition, of automised archives, of gramophony, of simulacrum, of 
wandering deprived of an address and destination” (Ibid., 305). In attempting 
to restore life to the dead, in fact the gramophone reveals the necessary and 
inevitable inherence of death in life, of absence and deferral in presence and 
the present. 
 Derrida’s reading of Ulysses powerfully connects the temporality of 
meaning with the technicity of “writing” as exemplified by the gramophone, 
and perhaps still more in the essay, by the telegraph and the telephone. But 
equally, it might be objected that the essay threatens to elide the temporal 
specificity of techne in aligning it with a différance that is “preontological” 
and a “universal presupposition”. Or, to put it another way, the essay’s 
conception of technology risks hypostatizing death: for while it discovers 
death in technology, it does not explore the historically variable technics of 
death.
 The aim of this study is twofold. First, it is to re-examine Joyce’s 
figuring of death by looking at the last story of Dubliners, “The Dead”, a text 
which dramatizes some of the risks involved in deconstructive readings of 
Joyce. To do so it draws on Walter Benjamin’s critical study of Leskov in 
“The Storyteller” (1936), which addresses the decline of storytelling through a 
consideration of the historical transformation of death, which is closely linked 
to the analysis of technology which occupied him at this time, and which finds 
its most famous formulation in “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical 
Reproducibility” (1935/6).2 Unfortunately, this connection has largely been 
ignored by English-speaking criticism, which has tended to dismiss “The 
Storyteller” as exhibiting “a palpable nostalgia for a bygone era”.3 However, 
2 “The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” and “The Work of 
Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility”, both in Walter Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 3, trans. E. Jephcott et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard UP, 
2002), 143-166 and 101-134. An early, unpublished draft of “The Storyteller”, entitled 
“Little Tricks of the Trade”, is thought to have been written between 1929 and 1933, 
which suggests that Benjamin’s engagement with the themes of “The Storyteller” is in 
fact co-extensive with the composition of the Work of Art essay; see Walter Benjamin, 
Selected Writings, Volume 2, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-
Harvard UP, 1999), 728-30. For an account Benjamin’s thinking of technology, see G. 
MacPhee, “Glass before its Time, Premature Iron: The Unforeseeable Futures of 
Technology in Benjamin’s Arcades Project”, New Formations 54 (2005). 
3 Michael Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Literary 
Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987), 8. Although this remains the most extensive study 
of Benjamin’s literary criticism in English, the volume offers no further consideration 
of the essay. For an alternative approach to Benjamin’s concept of criticism see 
Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 
1998), chapter 2. 
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far from seeking to reconstruct an integral moment now past, “The Storyteller” 
looks to identify different possible futures within the new condition of 
narrative marked by the disappearance of storytelling. From this perspective, 
Benjamin argues, “it is possible to find a new beauty in what is vanishing”.4
 The second aim is to ask a broader question not just about literary 
modernism, but about the “modernist criticism” of which deconstruction may 
yet be judged a part. For if poststructuralists—from Barthes to Kristeva to 
Derrida—elaborated their central intellectual terms and gestures by reading 
formally self-conscious texts by writers such as Mallarmé, Proust, and of 
course Joyce, then their critical positions—whether ostensibly positioned in 
relation to these authors or not—must be recognized as part of the “afterlife” 
of modernism. As such, the ways in which they remember, or repeat, or 
rehearse the past cultural constellation of modernism takes on a wider ethical 
or political significance. The history of Joyce criticism points with some 
urgency to the stakes involved here: for in the trajectory from high modernist 
formalist—whose texts perform a pure “revolution of the word” in which 
historical determination is erased in a blinding jouissance—to the “subaltern” 
Joyce of more recent postcolonial criticism—where the colonial project of 
erasing and eliding the premodern and the precolonial is itself recognized as 
part of the modernist text—the question of the appearance and disappearance 
of historical determinacy returns.5 Understood in these terms, the afterlife of 
Joyce’s text asks each critical perspective brought to bear upon it to what 
extent it is able to register both the openness to futurity involved in its 
experimental form—as linguistic indeterminacy or polyvocalism—and the 
ways in which that formal experimentation may encode the historical 
determinacy—the weight of dead generations, or “nightmare of history”—of 
European colonial modernity. To the extent that the globalized present remains 
determined by the moment of imperialism, this question remains unavoidable 
for any critical practice that claims an ethical or political significance. 
II 
In “The Storyteller” Benjamin aligns the secularization of death in Europe 
with his broader account of technology, a connection secured by an 
4 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 146; emphasis added. Subsequent references 
to this work will be in the body of the text, abbreviated as SW3 and accompanied by 
page numbers. 
5 As significant points that might help plot this trajectory see for example Colin 
McCabe’s James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (London: Macmillan, 1978), 
and Enda Duffy’s The Subaltern Ulysses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994).
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understanding of the nineteenth century as the “pre-history” of technological 
modernity. “In the course of the nineteenth century”, the essay observes, 
“bourgeois society—by means of medical and social, private and public 
institutions—realized a secondary effect, which may have been its 
subconscious main purpose: to enable people to avoid the sight of the dying” 
(SW3, 151). 
The importance of this shift for Benjamin lies in his understanding of 
the role of death in the historical transformation of apperception—or the 
spatio-temporal co-ordinates of cognition and perception which underlie 
particular configurations of meaning, value and belief. As the essay recounts, 
Dying was once a public process in the life of an individual, and a most 
exemplary one; think of the medieval pictures in which the deathbed 
has turned into a throne that people come toward through the wide-open 
doors of the dying person’s house. In the course of modern times, dying 
has been pushed further and further out of the perceptual world of the 
living. It used to be that there was not a single house, hardly a single 
room, in which someone had not once died[….] Today people live in 
rooms that have never been touched by death—dry dwellers of eternity; 
and when their end approaches, they are stowed away in sanatoria or 
hospitals by their heirs. (SW3 151) 
This account emphasizes the cognitive and perceptual significance of death by 
stressing its constitutive role in structuring the “perceptual world of the 
living”, and by identifying its visibility with instruction and communicability. 
The disappearance of death therefore marks a crucial shift associated with the 
rise of modern, technological societies, a shift which Benjamin describes in 
terms of the decay of “experience proper” (Erfahrung) and the predominance 
of “lived experience” (Erlebnis).6
Within this framework, the apperceptive conditions of meaning and 
belief in pre-modern societies are understood to imply a spatio-temporal 
continuum characterized by the community of creation and the eternity of the 
Creator, rather than being restricted within the purview of the isolated 
consciousness and its discrete life-span. Consequently, each individual death 
finds its meaning within the continuity of “experience” (Erfahrung), a spatio-
temporal configuration in which death appears as a recurring motif within the 
texture of experience, not as the final limit or point of cessation. In “The 
Storyteller”, this apperceptive arrangement is imaged in the vocabulary of 
weaving and in the recurring figure of the medieval church clock with “its 
revolving procession of creatures—a procession in which, depending on 
circumstances, Death is either the leader or the last wretched straggler” (SW3
153). As Benjamin remarks in another instance, “this is an image for a 
6 See the important essay “Experience and Poverty” (1933), in Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 2, 731-5. The essay was published in Prague just months after 
Hitler’s rise to power, and although brief, it provides a significant context for 
understanding Benjamin’s writing through the 1930s. 
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collective experience to which even the deepest shock in every individual 
experience—death—constitutes no impediment or barrier” (SW3 157). 
The emergence of the modern subject implies a quite different 
structuring of apperception, which in turn transforms the nature of death. 
While death can be assimilated or made meaningful within the experiential co-
ordinates of the medieval world, from the standpoint of modern, atomized 
subjectivity, death is external to meaning since it marks the cessation of lived 
experience (Erlebnis). Death “disappears” in the sense that it becomes the limit 
of an individualized experience, rather than a recurring constituent of 
collective experience. 
Understood in these terms, the disappearance of death marks a 
transformation in the very conditions of meaning, a transformation which is 
described in the Work of Art essay as the “shattering of tradition” (SW3 104) 
and in “The Storyteller” as the decline of the communicability of experience 
(SW3 143-4). Benjamin’s term Erfahrung designates an experiential matrix 
which, despite continual modification, remains relatively stable over time, and 
so implies a mode of transmissibility or tradition that includes both persistence 
and destruction. The endurance of objects—whether linguistic or visual 
artifacts, patterns of behavior or ritual, or social customs and institutions—
involves their reoccurrence within an interpretative context that is at once 
comparable with and different to that in which they were produced. Objects 
are therefore subject to reinterpretation, but within the confines of the relative 
continuity of tradition: as such, interpretation involves a transaction or 
negotiation between different configurations of experience. However, once the 
conditions of experience are localized within the apperceptive subject as “lived 
experience” (Erlebnis), the relative continuity engendered by the collective 
patterning of Erfahrung is lost; therefore, each new experiential context is 
radically discontinuous or incommensurable. While the object may 
nonetheless be read or deciphered, interpretation now proceeds according to 
the parameters of the existing conditions of experience, effacing the traces of 
those in which it was produced. 
The disappearance of death in the welter of lived experience therefore 
marks a fundamental reformulation of the very terms of the historicity of 
meaning—or of what Benjamin calls the “afterlife” (fortleben, nachleben) of 
the work.7 This new condition is manifested for Benjamin in the prevalence of 
“information” that accompanies the rise of the newspaper: “the value of 
information”, the essay remarks, “does not survive the moment in which it was 
new”, and so “it lives only at that moment” (SW3 148). Paradoxically, then, 
while tradition involves both the continuing life and death of the transmitted 
7 Benjamin’s notion of “after-life” is developed in “The Task of the Translator” (1922) 
and “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” (1919-22), both in Walter Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 1, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard 
UP, 1996), 253-64 and 297-360. 
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object, in lived experience what is transmissible is now only death—or the 
failure of another context of experience to appear. Thus, as Benjamin observes 
elsewhere, “the buried corpse” has become “the ‘transcendental Subject’ of 
historical consciousness”.8
“The Storyteller” explores the prospects for narrative within this new 
condition by way of a comparison between the different possible futures 
signaled in turn by the story and by the novel form, which for Benjamin 
includes the short story.9 However, the temporal orientation of this comparison 
has been widely misunderstood, and underlies the accusations of nostalgia 
leveled at the essay. Benjamin associates story and novel with, respectively, 
Erfahrung and Erlebnis, in the sense that the structuring of each narrative 
mode finds a particular affinity or compatibility with a different configuration 
of experience; but this is not to identify a particular narrative mode with a 
corresponding historical “stage”, nor limit its significance to a single point in 
time.10 Indeed, the fundamental premise of the essay is that although the 
experiential conditions which gave rise to the story are now lost, the story 
“lives on”—not authentically or as it once was, but inauthentically.11 Its 
analysis of the story is not an act of resurrection, which would disinter the 
story and reconstruct it as it once really was, but an examination of its 
“afterlife”, in which the story—like the vitriolized body of the young miner of 
Falun in Leskov’s story “The Unexpected Reunion” (“Unverhofftes
Wiedersehen”)—reoccurs within changed historical circumstances to 
unprecedented effect (SW3 152). 
Understood in these terms, “The Storyteller” pursues two distinct 
aims, although in the present context we are concerned only with the first of 
these. Its initial task is to develop a critique of the novel that will respond to 
the experimental tendencies we have come to associate with aesthetic 
8 Walter Benjamin, “Central Park” (1938-9), trans. Lloyd Spencer, New German 
Critique 34 (1985), 35. 
9 “In point of fact”, writes Benjamin, modern humanity “has succeeded in abbreviating 
even storytelling. We have witnessed the evolution of the ‘short story’, which has 
removed itself from oral tradition and no longer permits the slow piling up, one on top 
of another, of thin, transparent layer which constitutes the most appropriate image of 
the way in which the perfect narrative is revealed through the layers of various 
retellings” (Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 150). 
10 In fact, Benjamin’s approach is even more dynamic than this summary suggests, 
since the distinction of “story” and “novel” already marks a rethinking of the narrative 
possibilities of epic; see Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 152-4. 
11 Leskov was of course not a journeyman or medieval seafarer but, like Leopold 
Bloom, a commercial traveler. His stories therefore do not mark the authentic return of 
storytelling but its inauthentic after-life, as the essay repeatedly makes clear. More 
broadly, Benjamin understands the condition of narrative within technological 
modernity in terms of the after-life of the story, although again this return is 
inauthentic; see note 13 below. 
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modernism, but without falling back upon notions of progress or decline. Its 
second is to generate an alternative framework for addressing the new 
narrative forms generated by technological media like radio and film, in order 
to provide a counterweight to the aesthetic categories inherited from 
Romanticism and the Enlightenment.12 Thus, far from being an antiquarian 
exercise, the essay proposes a double agenda whose outlook is decidedly 
forward-thinking.
III
The comparison of the story and the novel form in “The Storyteller” is 
designed to draw out the implications for narrative of the decay of collective 
experience (Erfahrung) and the predominance of lived experience (Erlebnis).
Within the terms of collective experience, the course of the world and the fate 
of the community are viewed as intimately entwined, so that the historical 
experience of the collective provides the categories for understanding the 
world. From this perspective, the relationship of events to one another is 
continually modified according to the unfolding fate of the community, which 
reinterprets its destiny in the light of its changing fortunes. In contrast, the 
viewpoint of the modern subject is bereft of such an inherited experiential 
context, wherein the unfolding of events would remain meaningful within the 
terms of tradition—even if that meaning changes over time. Instead, the 
subject is isolated from the course of events, and views them externally as a 
fixed causal trajectory that ultimately ends in a discrete point or moment of 
finality. Such a perspective is characterized by spatial individuation and 
temporal fixity in its isolation and freezing of a succession of discrete 
moments as the chain of cause and effect (SW3 152-3).  
These different spatio-temporal configurations of meaning underlie 
the essay’s comparison of story and novel. According to Benjamin, storytelling 
does not pursue the unique narrative of an individualized personality, but 
summons up “many diffuse occurrences” (SW3 154) within which the role of 
protagonist “keeps shifting from figure to figure” (SW3 160). And because the 
12 This second task predominates in the last four sections of the essay, and centers on 
the different ways in which the fairy tale anticipates the condition of narrative in 
modern technology; see Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 156-62. Although 
largely ignored, this connection is in fact fundamental to Benjamin’s engagement with 
technology: see the fragment “Mickey Mouse” (1931) and “Experience and Poverty”, 
both in Benjamin, Selected Writing, Volume 2, especially 545 and 735; and the 
discussion of Mickey Mouse in the Work of Art essay, where Benjamin observes that 
technology’s “renew[al]” of “an old tradition” is not necessarily “reassuring” 
(Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 130n30). 
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story anticipates a continuum of readability in tradition, it eschews the patterns 
of cause and effect that emerge within the individualized viewpoint. 
Consequently, it strives to remain “free from explanation”, so that although 
“the most extraordinary, marvelous things, are related with the greatest 
accuracy, […] the psychological connections among the events are not forced 
on the reader” and “it is left up to him to interpret things the way he 
understands them”. In contrast to the information that characterizes the 
newspaper—“which does not survive the moment in which it was new”—the 
story “does not expend itself”, but in the unfolding of tradition “preserves and 
concentrates its energy and is capable of releasing it after a long time” (SW3
148). In being reinterpreted in tradition it is both reproduced and recast within 
successively modified contexts of experience, so that its afterlife involves an 
accumulation that is both an act of preservation and an act of destruction or 
betrayal. In this way it can both “absorb the course of events […] and […] 
make its peace with the passing of these, with the power of death” (SW3 153-
4).
In the novel, on the other hand, the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of 
meaning are bounded by death, and so are locked within the individualized 
compass of lived experience. However, far from lamenting the loss of 
collective experience, this comparison is designed to generate a critical 
framework which aligns contemporary literary experimentation with the 
longer-term tendencies towards irony, parody and aesthetic self-consciousness, 
which have characterized the novel from its inception. Benjamin’s aim is to 
avoid a progressive conception of literary development, and instead to describe 
the novel as a force-field of tensions whose coherence is perennially liable to 
interruption, distortion and disfigurement. 
The comparison between story and novel in the essay is first of all 
designed to overturn dominant expectations about representationalism, which 
extrapolates the novel’s power to render the “fullness” of experience from its 
prosaic location in the profane world of modernity. From Benjamin’s 
perspective, however, it is precisely because the novel is located “in the midst 
of life’s fullness” and seeks to “represen[t] […] this fullness” that it “gives 
evidence” not of the self-presence of life, but “of the profound perplexity of 
the living” (SW3 146). For once the temporal continuum of tradition is lost, 
inner experience becomes separated from the course of external events, and its 
categories of meaning and value appear arbitrary and capricious—the source 
not of confidence in the self-presence of meaning, but of “profound 
perplexity”. The conflict between internal time consciousness and other modes 
of narrative or historical time which characterizes the novel is understood as a 
crucial manifestation of this perplexity. In the language of Lukács’ Theory of 
the Novel (1920) which the essay invokes, this awareness of time is identified 
as a function of the “transcendental homelessness” which is for Lukács the 
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fundamental condition of the novel.13 Thus, in Benjamin’s view, the novel’s 
rootedness in lived experience aligns it not with the communicability of 
meaning and the fullness of life, but with incommunicability and loss: “To 
write a novel”, remarks Benjamin, “is to take to the extreme that which is 
incommensurable in the representation of human existence” (SW3 146). 
The critical force of Benjamin’s approach lies in its articulation of 
Lukács’ conception of the novel as “the form of transcendental homelessness” 
(SW3 155). In the modern condition of transcendental homelessness, lived 
experience is bounded by death, and so its assignment of value and meaning 
remains arbitrary because internal and unrelated to the course of the world. 
However, in the representation of lived experience provided by the novel, 
events are invested with an apparently “necessary” meaning in their advance 
towards “that death [which] is already waiting for them—a very definite death, 
at a very definite place”, namely the literal or figurative “death” which marks 
the end of the novel (SW3 156). The essay’s approach cuts across the notions 
of empathy, identification, “reflection” and representationalism long 
associated with the novel; for according to Benjamin, 
The novel is significant not because it presents someone else’s fate to 
us […] but because this stranger’s fate, by virtue of the flame which 
consumes it, yields to us the warmth which we never draw from our 
own fate. What draws the reader to a novel is the hope of warming his 
shivering life with a death he reads about. (SW3 156) 
Rather than recognizing death as a nonidentical moment of collective 
experience, the novel integrates individual and world by identifying the 
horizons of collective meaning with the individualized limits of lived 
experience. But the “warmth” it thereby promises remains an empty hope, 
since this identification only serves to consolidate the subject’s frigid isolation 
and so confirm the cold arbitrariness of its unhappy fate. 
The essay’s political critique of the novel form is underpinned by this 
understanding of its generalization of an individualized conception of death. 
However, the essay seeks to establish a critical framework that avoids blanket 
judgments, and so its articulation of the tensions inherent in the novel allows 
for developments that might nonetheless imbue the novel form with a critical 
or illuminating charge. Thus, the condition of transcendental homelessness 
generates “a basic structure of the novel”, a set of vectors or tendencies 
inherent within the novel form with which individual works have to contend. 
These tendencies are most clearly manifested in the Bildungsroman, which 
according to the essay “bestows the most brittle justification” on the social 
order “by integrating the social process with the development of the person”; 
13 SW3 155. In effect, the essay draws out possibilities within Lukács’ theory of the 
novel which have been almost entirely ignored within English speaking criticism. For 
an account of the philosophical complexity of Lukács’ theory of the novel see J.M. 
Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel. Lukács: Marxism and the Dialectics of Form
(Brighton: Harvester, 1984). 
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thus, “the unattainable is event” (SW3 146-7). 
However, the essay invokes a roll call of apparently quintessential
novels—from Don Quixote to Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre—which are 
understood in fact to work against these tendencies by distorting the novel 
form. The point here is not that such works escape the limits of the novel in the 
sense of standing outside the condition of transcendental homelessness, but 
rather that they are able to offer insights into this very historical condition 
precisely by revealing the temporal specificity of their own configuration of 
meaningfulness. Elsewhere, Benjamin locates this illuminatory potential in the 
“death of intention” and “the mortification of works”—that is, in the process 
of ruin or disfigurement which marks the “afterlife” of an apparently integral 
configuration.14 For Benjamin, such instances offer an insight that exceeds the 
limits of the novel form, precisely because in distorting its parameters they 
bring into view something of its conditions of possibility.15 Seen from within 
the ineluctable march of events towards their conclusion, the novel’s freezing 
of lived experience imbues it with a meaningfulness that bears the appearance 
of necessity; but when seen from “without”, this freezing works to crystallize a 
particular structuring of meaning, whose configuration emerges in its 
incompatibility with other contexts of interpretation. 
Rather than understanding the novel form in terms of the rendering of 
lived experience, “The Storyteller” argues that we should understand it in 
terms of an “after-life” that follows death. For at the moment of death, the 
essay reminds us, a “sequence of images is set in motion inside a man” which 
grants to him “views of himself in which he has encountered himself without 
being aware of it” (SW3 151). 
IV
While “The Storyteller” approaches the novel form through the historicity of 
death, Joyce’s short story “The Dead” invites a reassessment of the 
conventions of prose fiction through its oblique invocation of the remembered 
dead. But if in retrospect there appears to be an affinity between Joyce and 
Benjamin here, “The Dead” has increasingly come to be seen as bearing 
witness to the ethical dimension of poststructuralist practices of reading. 
Joyce’s text therefore provides an opportunity for examining the contemporary 
significance of Benjamin’s critical framework. 
14 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. J. Osborne (London: 
Verso, 1977), 36, 182.
15 For a fuller account of the dynamics of Benjamin’s thinking here see G. MacPhee, 
The Architecture of the Visible: Technology and Urban Visual Culture (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 186-193. 
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In “Joyce’s ‘The Dead’: The Dissolution of the Self and the Police”, 
John Riquelme sets out to refute the charge that Joyce’s short story enacts an 
irresponsible dissolution of the self in “the free play of language [celebrated] 
by poststructuralists” such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva.16 He argues 
instead that “the dissolution of the self” described by the text does not entail 
the loss of political agency but “the exposure of delusion” (Riquelme 124). 
“The Dead” therefore performs an ethical deconstruction, a performance which 
involves the reader in a process of dissolution and exposure elicited by the 
recognition of the inevitability of death. As such, Riquelme writes, the text 
“provides the opportunity for a recognition of human limits that can help make 
freedom, with all its risks and uncertainties, possible” (139). 
Riquelme’s reading conceives of “The Dead” as tracing two parallel 
trajectories of dissolution that move from plenitude to vacuum. The first 
centers on the figure of Gabriel Conroy, who “encounters the inevitability of 
his own death” in hearing his wife Gretta’s story of lost love, and so “loses 
[…] his sense of being at the pinnacle of multiple hierarchies” (Riquelme 132). 
This moment of crisis “creates a vacuum where previously there seemed to be 
a plenitude”, a process described as “the emptying out of the previously full 
image” of the self that enables “the potential transvaluation of everything 
[Gabriel] thought he knew” (Riquelme 139). The second trajectory, which 
shadows the first, involves the narrative’s shifting positioning of the reader. 
The reader begins with a “deluded sense of stability [that] corresponds to 
Gabriel’s pose of knowing and controlling” (Riquelme 135), a stability that is 
progressively undermined by “the increasing use of the free indirect style” in 
the final moments of the short story (Riquelme 125). This process reaches its 
apogee in Gabriel’s final repetition of the phrase from the newspaper spoken 
earlier by Mary Jane—that “the snow was general all over Ireland”.17 This 
repetition is understood as “a choral speaking” which “involves a blurring of 
the boundaries of the individual speaking self” and the articulation of “a group 
speech whose content implies the equality of all members” (Riquelme 138). 
For Riquelme, “the dissolution of the character’s self is communicated and 
transferred [to the reader] through free indirect style”, so that “our own stance 
as the spectator who possesses knowledge and control is destabilised” (139, 
135).
The ethical force identified by this reading depends on its 
understanding of the text’s figuring of death. For Riquelme, death is conceived 
in opposition to “the culturally generated shapes and boundaries of hierarchical 
16 John Riquelme, “Joyce’s ‘The Dead’: The Dissolution of the Self and the Police”, in 
R.M. Bosinelli & H.F. Mosher (eds.) ReJoycing: New Readings of Dubliners
(Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1998), 132. 
17 James Joyce, Dubliners (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), 220. All subsequent 
references will be to this edition, with page numbers given in parentheses in the body of 
the text. 
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difference”, as a “lack that resists being rationalised” (138-9); its recognition 
therefore constitutes a “truth that strenuously resists being eradicated by 
deluded self-representations and by self-perpetuating social hierarchies” (134). 
As such, the moment of crisis that accompanies Gabriel’s sudden awareness of 
mortality at the end of the short story is “not […] an experience of 
undecidability but [… a] decidedly unambiguous recognition of eventual 
death” (Riquelme 132). In these terms, Riquelme’s reading deploys the 
premonition of certain death against the ambiguity of appearance that 
characterizes the world of social differences, and consequently death comes to 
function as a principle of equivalence or indifference. For Riquelme, Gabriel’s 
recognition of “the mortality he shares” with the women he had earlier sought 
to dominate and master enables him to understand that in the dance of death 
“all partners are equal” (131, 139). 
 In the light of Benjamin’s essay, what is perhaps most striking about 
this account is its untheorized assumption of an individualized conception of 
death—“the obvious fact”, as Riquelme puts it, “that the survival of the 
individual is limited” (139). Such a conception of death—as a “vacuum” or 
point of indifference that stands in opposition to the differentiated appearance 
of the social world—adopts the standpoint of the isolated subject, for whom 
death looms as the cessation of meaning, an emptiness that is undifferentiated 
and absolutely unknowable. As Riquelme concedes, although without 
exploring its consequences, the critical perspective that governs his reading is 
located “this side of death”, and so its outlook remains centered on the journey 
from delusion to knowledge performed by the dominant consciousness of the 
narrative, Gabriel Conroy (138; emphasis added). Read from within the drama 
of isolated consciousness, the events of the short story—no matter how 
apparently inconsequential or arbitrary—assume a meaningfulness in relation 
to this overarching trajectory, forming an abbreviated Bildungsroman in which 
interiority finds its truth in the unfolding course of the world (SW3 150). Thus, 
despite its claim to base its ethics in an analysis of the performativity of the 
text, Riquelme’s reading restricts the short story’s formal dynamics within an 
individualized conception of death—as a Bildungsroman of dissolution. 
In fact, the dynamics of Joyce’s text exceed the parameters of the 
Bildungsroman in terms that anticipate Benjamin’s critique of the novel form 
in “The Storyteller”.18 Although Riquelme claims that Gabriel’s journey from 
delusion to certainty is accompanied by “an increased use of free indirect 
style” in the final moments of the short story, it is very difficult to identify any 
such gradient, or to chart a progressive destabilization or distancing of the 
reader (Riquelme 125). Rather, free indirect discourse is deployed throughout 
18 The text repeatedly ironizes the congruence of inner and outer meaning dreamed of 
by the Bildungsroman: thus, just before Gretta’s disclosure, Gabriel muses that 
“perhaps her thoughts had been running with his”, and then proclaims “I think I know 
what is the matter” (D 214, 215). 
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“The Dead”—as Riquelme’s own reading in fact indicates—and we are never 
allowed to assume the reliability of any narrative viewpoint or align our 
interpretation with a neutral, authoritative narrative voice. This uncertainty is 
demonstrated at the outset when Gabriel and Gretta arrive to be greeted by the 
maid Lily: the disjunction between the rendering of Gabriel’s surname in 
reported speech (“Is it snowing again, Mr Conroy?”) and his internal 
recognition of Lily’s “non-standard” pronunciation (“Gabriel smiled at the 
three syllables she had given his surname”) underlines the unreliability not 
simply of narration, but even of direct discourse, which presents itself as a 
neutral medium of report (D 175). The accumulated effect of this pervasive 
destabilization is to generate an awareness of the text as a particular 
configuration of meaningfulness, rather than simply pursuing the meaning(s) 
available within the unfolding of the narrative. Or, in terms of our discussion 
of “The Storyteller”, while we inevitably read “The Dead” from within the 
drama of Gabriel’s consciousness—so following the journey from delusion to 
recognition—the text constantly invites us to examine from “without” the 
structuring of apperception which underlies this drama. 
The parameters of this configuration begin to obtrude in moments of 
anxiety, when Gabriel projects a fantasy world whose comforting co-ordinates 
correspond to the patterns of his own consciousness in a way that the 
experiential world of other consciousnesses does not. So, after his 
uncomfortable conversation with Miss Ivors, who jokingly accuses him of 
being a “West Briton”, Gabriel takes refuge in the imaginary landscape of a 
Phoenix Park dominated by the obelisk commemorating Arthur Wellesley, 
Duke of Wellington: 
How pleasant it would be to walk out alone, first along by the river 
and then through the park. The snow would be lying on the branches 
of the trees and forming a bright cap on the top of the Wellington 
Monument. How much more pleasant it would be than here at the 
supper-table! (D 189) 
Again, just before his after-dinner speech, Gabriel calms his nerves by 
transporting himself back to the park, where “the Wellington Monument wore 
a gleaming cap of snow that flashed westwards over the white field of the 
Fifteen Acres” (D 199). The fantasies to which Gabriel’s consciousness 
retreats at such moments of anxiety provide glimpses into its apperceptive 
configuration, the co-ordinates of space and time which underpin perception 
and meaning. In the cartography of Gabriel’s consciousness, the symbolic 
power of the “Iron Duke”—a native Dubliner who more than any other came 
to embody the military and political dominion of the British Empire—
coincides with the monumental architecture of the obelisk, whose domination 
of the surrounding landscape reduces it to a uniform and undifferentiated 
blankness.19 So, when confronted by orders of experience which exceed its 
19 For a suggestive analysis of the architecture of the obelisk and its role in the 
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own parameters of understanding—moments which significantly culminate in 
the playful but pointed charge of his succumbing to an unmanly colonial 
subservience by a woman who is both modern in her anti-imperial feminism, 
yet proud of an Irish culture that recalls the premodern (however 
problematically)—the fabric of Gabriel’s consciousness is restored by the 
recall of the idealized spatio-temporal configuration embodied in the 
monument to the imperial Irishman par excellence—Arthur Wellesley, victor 
of Waterloo, British Prime Minister, and first Duke of Wellington. 
Throughout the short story, Gabriel maps the physical and semantic 
geography of Dublin through the triangulation of three significant monuments: 
alongside the Wellington Monument, the statues of William of Orange and 
Daniel O’Connell also feature as key reference points in Gabriel’s negotiation 
of his social world.20 But more than this, the parameters of his imagination and 
understanding are imperial and monumental, in that the heterogeneity of lived 
experience—in which the modern and premodern, the Irish and British, the 
Protestant and Catholic, the masculine and the feminine, are continually both 
demarcated and conflated—is fixed and ordered as a uniform panorama 
radiating from the central pinnacle of his own consciousness. This is a 
consciousness that sees itself at once as modern and therefore beyond national 
identification (figured by the abstract geometry of the obelisk), and yet as 
somehow secretly and properly British (architecturally trumping the Oriental 
obelisk brought by Napoleon to stand in the Place de Concord, just as 
Wellington humbled the French Emperor at Waterloo). And as such, it is a 
configuration of consciousness that can assert its own integrity and dominance 
through resort to a violence which does not need to be justified, for what falls 
within its purview becomes inert material awaiting refashioning and entry into 
the fullness of the present and the modern. Thus, Gabriel’s fierce projection of 
his own anger and sexual desire during their journey back to the hotel renders 
Gretta as a stiff and lifeless stage property within his fantasies of romantic love 
and sexual conquest; and so he fails to register what is made increasingly clear 
to the reader—namely that Gretta is mourning her lost love, the dead boy 
Michael Furey. 
The apperceptive co-ordinates of Gabriel’s consciousness emerge 
most clearly in the doubled and interrupted nature of his final “epiphany”. For 
Gabriel initially assumes that Gretta’s thoughts are directed towards the living, 
an assumption that betrays an imagination which restricts possibility within the 
constitution of the modern nation-state see Georges Bataille, “The Obelisk”, in Visions
of Excess, trans. Alan Stoekl (1938; Manchester: Manchester UP, 1985), 213-22. 
20 See Joyce, Dubliners 205 and 211-12. The Anglo-Irish Wellington (1769-1852), 
victor of Waterloo and subsequently British Prime Minister, seems to symbolize the 
settlement that would in Gabriel’s eyes reconcile Protestant Unionism and Catholic 
Ireland—that is, through the imperialist identification of political authority and military 
force.
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opposed poles of presence and absence—just as the visible world is reduced to 
the homogenous substantiality of the monumental. What unsettles Gabriel is 
not this first revelation—that Gretta might love another—but rather the 
second—that her love might be extended to one among the dead. The 
endurance of Gretta’s love for Michael Furey within a world in which he is 
absent introduces a prospect that exceeds the parameters of Gabriel’s 
imagination—the persistence of a different possible future within a present in 
which it was not actualized, and so cannot appear. 
V
Rather than remaining within the terms of the narrative of Gabriel’s 
consciousness, Benjamin’s critique of the novel form focuses attention on the 
fragility of the Bildungsroman’s alignment of inner and outer meaning. As 
such, it draws attention to the text’s formal ironies and questions the very 
notion of “epiphany” or “revelation”. But furthermore, it extends the 
parameters of reading by asking not only how Gabriel’s consciousness is 
structured, but also how this structuring compares with other possible 
configurations. 
Seen from within the drama of Gabriel’s consciousness, the moment of 
revelation marks the dissolution of delusion, and so constitutes a watershed in 
understanding; but seen from the perspective of the apperceptive co-ordinates 
of understanding, this moment does not mark a qualitative change. From the 
outset, Gabriel’s outlook assumes a uniform world of substantiality, an array 
of statues whose homogeneous solidity defines the self-presence of the living 
now. Such a perspective implies and takes shape from its corollary, a pure 
absence or vacuum that constitutes a realm of death uncorrupted by the social 
differences and hierarchies of the living. Thus, the netherworld of the dead that 
appears in the penultimate paragraph inhabits the same co-ordinates as his 
monumental vision of the living, “a grey impalpable world” that supplies the 
negative image for “the solid world itself”: 
The tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness 
he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a 
dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that 
region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of, 
but could not apprehend, their wayward and flickering existence. His 
own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid 
world itself, which the dead had one time reared and lived in, was 
dissolving and dwindling. (D 219) 
But it is not Michael Furey who appears here: what appears, in fact, is the 
imagined “form of a young man” who is one among many “other forms”, 
featureless and undefined. Just as Gabriel’s earlier fantasies solipsistically 
reduce Gretta to the parameters of his own imaging and desire—whether as the 
166
sentimental image he titles Distant Music, or more brutally in his desire “to 
crush her body against his [and] overmaster her”—so this image reduces the 
myriad complexity of the relations between living and dead to an 
undifferentiated projection of his own anxiety (D 214). For although this 
fantasy imagines the dissolution of the ego in the recognition of shared 
mortality, it is Aunt Julia who joins the dead in Gabriel’s imagination, while 
Gabriel himself undertakes the onerous task of consoling the living, as much at 
the center of things as when he carves the goose at the dinner table. 
Like the Wellington monument, whose imperial architecture reduces 
the surrounding landscape to a uniform and undifferentiated blankness, 
Gabriel’s conception of death smothers all differences among the dead, 
freezing and homogenizing their variegated and constantly shifting 
relationships with the living. Far from constituting a “choral speaking”, the 
final imagined scene of the snow “general all over Ireland” offers a complex 
image of the desires buried deep within the novel form. The harmony of 
interior and exterior dreamt of by the Bildungsroman may appear as old as 
nature, but as this image reminds us, it is in fact a function of a world split 
between the isolated subject and the disconnected events which confront it 
every morning in the newspaper.
 If Benjamin’s critique of the novel form emphasizes the limits of 
Gabriel’s imagination, it also draws attention to an engagement with the dead 
that Riquelme’s reading neglects—one which unfolds not in Gabriel’s 
imagination, but in Gretta’s story of lost love. However, Gretta’s storytelling 
demands a complicated kind of double reading, since the text denies us access 
to her interior life and her story is available only through the mediation of 
Gabriel’s limited perspective. But this means that, in Benjamin’s words, 
Gretta’s account is stripped of “the psychological connections among the 
events”, leaving it “free from explanation”; and so it is “restored” to something 
that resembles—although inauthentically—the condition of the story (SW3
148). Though filtered through Gabriel’s point of view, the text suggests the 
lineaments of another configuration of experience in the temporal ambiguity 
introduced at the moment she recalls the image of her lost love. In contrast to 
the temporal consistency of Gabriel’s narrative viewpoint, Gretta’s account of 
her last encounter with Michael Furey is characterized by an oscillation of 
tenses:
I implored him to go home at once and told him that he would get his 
death in the rain. But he said he did not want to live. I can see his 
eyes as well as well! He was standing at the end of the wall where 
there was a tree. (D 218) 
While Gabriel’s vision can see only “the solid world” of the living or the “grey 
impalpable world” of the dead, Gretta’s storytelling suggests a different 
configuration of experience. In shifting from the past tense of retrospective 
narration to the present tense—“I can see his eyes as well as well!”—Gretta 
testifies to the paradoxical living on of a moment that is dead and gone. 
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Gretta’s storytelling, then, marks the appearance of a mode of experience that 
can no longer appear in the world of the novel—and so it appears negatively,
in its difference to and incommensurability with the configuration of Gabriel’s 
consciousness.
 Despite its claim to center on the recognition of difference, 
Riquelme’s reading inadvertently equalizes Gretta’s memory of Michael Furey 
and Gabriel’s undifferentiated world of shades—reducing them both to the 
homogenous multitude of “the dead”. But as the short story reminds us by 
placing Michael Furey—the “boy in the gasworks”—alongside that other 
representative of the departed—Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington—the 
dead are not the same, and the differences and hierarchies that separate them 
do not simply fade away on their demise (SW3 216). Though Riquelme locates 
an ethical charge in the liquidation of social “boundaries of hierarchical 
difference” he sees at the story’s conclusion (Riquelme 138), in doing so he 
erases the historical determinacy that exists not as a “content” to be 
“represented”, but embedded in its configuration of meaning. If British 
colonialism itself erases or overwrites other histories—as premodern, and as 
such nonsensical or without meaning—so that they cannot appear within the 
colonial text, such histories may leave their mark or imprint in the warps and 
distortions they produce in the very configuration of meaning which seeks to 
exclude them—as we have seen in the return of Greta’s storytelling within the 
parameters of Gabriel’s imperial and monumental perspective. In erasing the 
differences among the dead, Riquelme obscures the determinate absence of 
what has been lost and so cannot appear, the determinate history of erasure 
and loss which allows British imperial culture to present itself paradoxically as 
a modernity that is without nation yet always at home, a universality that is 
somehow particular to itself.21 In its ethical concern for an opening to futurity, 
Riquelme’s deconstructive reading elides the historical determinacy of a past 
which has been lost and cannot appear, but which continues to organize the 
hierarchies and distinctions that underpin the postcolonial present. What this 
elision suggests, therefore, is that the differences which distinguish among the 
dead, and tie them to the fate of the living, are not static, but have their 
afterlife in the stratified and uneven space of transmission that patterns the 
conflict between individual and collective memory, and organizes the 
parameters of meaning. 
Reading Joyce’s text through the frame of “The Storyteller” is not 
merely an antiquarian exercise, since the interplay between the historicity of 
death and the configuration of meaning staged by these two texts has itself 
become a central issue for contemporary criticism. Our own critical moment 
has been powerfully defined by the recognition of the inherence of death in the 
21 For a consideration of the paradoxes of British national identity see Graham 
MacPhee and Prem Poddar (eds.), Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial 
Perspective (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2007). 
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apparent fullness of meaning, where death is both the necessary condition of 
meaning—as repetition or iterability—and its inescapable undoing, its 
irrevocable openness to futurity. In “Ulysses Gramophone”, this doubleness is 
articulated as “the yes of memory, with its recapitulating control and reactive 
repetition”, and “the light, dancing yes of affirmation, the open affirmation of 
the gift”, a pairing which registers both the weight of memory and repetition, 
and the continual opening of this repetition to difference and futurity. But in 
order to avoid being caught up in a progressive dialectic, Derrida insists that 
these terms “refer to each other without having any relationship between 
them”.22 As such, death becomes the matrix of meaning and desire, yet it 
cannot be known in its historical determinacy, and so risks being hypostatized 
as an inert and empty vacuum, rather than being recognized in each moment of 
its constantly changing (dis)appearance in the present. 
Riquelme’s reading of “The Dead” dramatizes some of the risks 
involved in attempting to locate an ethical charge in such a conception of the 
unchanging and unknowable certainty of death. For as our reading of Joyce’s 
text suggests, if we cannot trace anything of the relationship between 
memory’s return and the articulation of difference, then we are unable to 
register how the history of return reconfigures the conditions of articulation. In 
this case, the ethical concern for openness to futurity becomes, at best, little 
more than piety, and, at worst, a new mode of self-deception, since it cannot 
distinguish how the differences among the dead may in their afterlife come to 
reinforce and reproduce the hierarchies of the living. 
West Chester University of Pennsylvania 
22 Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone”, 308; emphasis added. For a critical 
questioning of Derrida’s conception of a “democracy yet to come”, see 
Matthias Fritsch, “Derrida’s Democracy to Come”, Constellations 9:4 (2002), 
574-597.
